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ABSTRACT
This article will explore the oft-overlooked area of police powers granted to 
local municipalities by the California Constitution through the lens of marijuana 
dispensaries.  These dispensaries, and the obstacles they face, provide the perfect 
vantage point from which to survey the current status of zoning power in 
California.  This article will consider the extent and limits of what is known as the 
“police powers” of local municipalities: the power of cities, towns and counties to 
regulate, restrict, and proscribe the way in which land can be utilized within its 
borders.  If local municipalities are the creation of the state—indeed, an extension 
of the state government’s power, subject to its whims—then can a city, town, or 
county simply defy the expressed will of the state legislature?  Or, in a parallel real 
example, how can a fast-food restaurant hoping to open a new location in Los 
Angeles be banned outright from an entire community, even though such 
restaurants are sanctioned by the legislature in Sacramento?
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I. INTRODUCTION
“I’ve often thought that if our zoning boards could be put in charge of botanists, of 
zoologists and geologists, and people who know about the earth, we would have 
much more wisdom in such planning than we have when we leave it to the 
engineers . . . .”
-Justice William Orville Douglas
If local municipalities are a creation of the state—indeed, an extension of the 
state government’s power, subject to its whims—then can a city, town, or county 
simply defy the expressed will of the state legislature?1 Can a city planning 
commission, acting within the confines of the power granted to it by the state, flout 
state law in order to effectuate their own ends?  Or in real terms, how can a fast-
food restaurant hoping to open up a new location in Los Angeles be banned 
outright from an entire community, even though such restaurants are sanctioned by 
the legislature in Sacramento?2
This article is designed to explore the oft-overlooked area of police powers 
granted to local municipalities by the California Constitution.  The power of cities, 
towns, and counties to regulate, restrict, and proscribe the way in which land can 
be utilized within its borders is often taken for granted by those with the authority 
to do so.  Zoning rules and regulations are so common place that they are easily 
ignored.3  
On occasion, however, a request for a business permit crosses the desk of a 
local city planner that drags the zoning process to a standstill.4 Although it is 
counter-intuitive, just because a business is legal under state or federal law, does 
not mean that it can simply open anywhere; in some cases a business can be 
                                                          
* Pepperdine University School of Law, Juris Doctor candidate, 2012; BA Northeastern University.
1 This premise was established in California shortly after the state’s admission to the Union in 
1850.  See Webb v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 92 (Cal. 1913) (quoting Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220, 
233 (1860)) (“A municipal corporation is a public institution, created for public purposes; the 
municipality is a political subdivision or department of the state, governed, and regulated, and 
constituted by public law . . . the original power to control, as well as to create them, therefore, is in the 
Legislature.”); see also San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541, 557 (1872) (“[M]unicipal corporations 
are but subordinate subdivisions of the State Government, which may be created, altered, or abolished, 
at the will of the legislature . . . .”).
2 Jennifer Medina, In South Los Angeles, New Fast-Food Spots Get a ‘No, Thanks.’ N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/us/16fastfood.html.
3 Consider all the aspects of a town or city that zoning affects: where schools can be located, what 
businesses are allowed to open and where.  Homes are not often found in the middle of an industrial 
complex, and the reasoning for that is zoning. 
4 When faced with an increase in unwanted zoning applications, some cities have held special 
meetings in order to create moratoriums.  See City of Corona v. Naulls, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 
2008) (noting that following Naulls’ application to open a marijuana dispensary, the city of Corona held 
an emergency “special meeting” in order to create a moratorium on all future dispensaries). In some 
unfortunate situations, cities have spent years grappling with how to handle a new business. For an 
example look to the fast-food debate taking place in South Los Angeles for over two years: following a 
one year moratorium passed in 2008, the Los Angeles City Council extended the moratorium twice, 
while it debated the merits of an outright fast-food ban.  See supra note 2.  The moratorium was made 
permanent, and now, no new fast-food restaurants are allowed to open.  Id.
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banned outright from an entire jurisdiction.5 When this happens, litigation is 
almost certain to ensue and the question of whether or not a local municipality 
possesses the constitutional authority to ban said business—or in some extremes to 
criminalize it—once again rises from legal obscurity. 
This paper will consider the extent and limits of what is known as the “police 
powers” of local municipalities through the lens of the state-sanctioned marijuana 
dispensaries that have recently exploded into existence across the state.6 These 
dispensaries, though legal under state law, have been criminalized or banned 
permanently or temporarily in multiple jurisdictions throughout California, 
prompting a string of lawsuits that have left the state with a patchwork of legal 
guidelines.
This is not a narrow question addressing only dispensaries.  The issues 
surrounding local police powers affects any entrepreneur hoping to start a business 
in any given location, or in fact, any business already in existence.  Single 
individuals hoping to start a closely-held corporation are subject to the same 
zoning powers as publicly-traded mega companies.7 These dispensaries, however, 
and the obstacles they face, provide the perfect vantage point from which to survey 
the current status of zoning power in California. 
Part II of this article will provide the legal framework within which zoning 
authority exists, considering where local municipalities derive their power, the 
evolution of zoning law, and the deference the courts pay to the local authorities.  
Part III of this article will expand to consider the limits of zoning authority, the 
most important of which, for this analysis, is the preemption of state law.  If 
California law says that “big-box retailers” like Wal-Mart or timber mills operating 
within statutory limits are legal, how can a city ban them?  Can a city criminalize 
them?  Part IV will provide a very brief history of the legalization of medicinal 
marijuana in California and the current legal battles being fought over a 
dispensary’s right to exist in the face of local ordinances banning or criminalizing 
them.  Part V will analyze how zoning laws and the doctrine of preemption affects 
businesses of all types.  Part VI will apply the analysis to the real world.  Finally, 
this article will conclude by suggesting that the doctrine of preemption has been 
applied too weakly, and the current litigation over marijuana dispensaries provides 
the ideal opportunity for the courts to give the doctrine enough bite to protect legal 
businesses from the political whims of local governance. 
                                                          
5 See generally Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(finding that a zoning regulation banning all “big box” retailers from the city was within the police 
powers of the jurisdiction). 
6 “Before a 2007 moratorium, the city of Los Angeles had issued 186 medical marijuana 
dispensary licenses. Since the moratorium, nearly 800 applications for hardship exemptions have been 
filed.”  Where’s The Weed? L.A. TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-dispensaries-
i,0,5658093.htmlstory (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
7 Compare Wal-Mart Stores, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 421(dealing with a claim brought by publicly-
traded Wal-Mart), with City of Claremont v. Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009) (dealing with a 
claim brought against an individual hoping to start his own business). 
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II. LOCAL POLICE POWERS
“Our community is like many around the country that have . . . sophisticated 
planning and zoning regulations.  These are elements that are developed as a 
result of local community pressure to balance interests.”
-United States Representative Earl Blumenauer
A. Zoning Ordinances
“Zoning is the deprivation, for the public good, of certain uses by owners of 
property to which their property might otherwise be put . . . .”8 In its purest form, 
zoning ordinances manifest themselves as the division of a municipality into 
districts, with each district having a unique set of regulations.9 These regulations 
most commonly foist restrictions upon property owners regarding the extent to 
which their property may be used, and more often than not, concern the type of 
structures that can be built and the types of businesses that can operate out of 
them.10
The overarching theory behind zoning power is that property-owners—or 
more specifically, the land that they own—may be regulated for the good of the 
community as a whole.11 These regulations are most often created by a city 
planning agency or other governmental body in order to create a “general plan” for 
the city as required under California law.12 Although zoning decisions affect 
specified, individual neighborhoods, and the property owners within them, they are 
firmly legislative decisions as they ultimately affect the community at large.13  
These decisions require the analysis of aesthetic, environmental, and economic 
                                                          
8 Gilgert v. Stockton Port Dist., 60 P.2d 847, 850 (Cal. 1936).
9 See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1009 (Cal. 1976); see also Consol. Rock 
Prods. Co. v. City of L.A., 370 P.2d 342, 345–46 (Cal. 1962).
10 See Birkenfeld, 550 P.2d at 1009; see also Consol. Rock Prods. Co., 370 P.2d at 345–46. 
11 Korean Am. Legal Advocacy Found. v. City of L.A., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 536–40 (Ct. App. 
1994) (referencing Floresta, Inc. v. City Council, 12 Cal. Rptr. 182 (Ct. App. 1961)).  In Floresta,
Justice Tobriner provides a succinct overview of zoning power and its origins: 
The concept of zoning reaches back historically to the Renaissance plans of 
public planning that started in Italy and spread to France; it is symbolized by the 
famous plan of Sir Christopher Wren for London after the fire of 1666 and in the 
United States by the L’Enfant’s planned cities of Washington and Indianapolis; 
indeed, before its first significant development in the city planning of New York 
in this country, such planning had been widely accepted in Sweden and 
Germany. As is stated in Recent Social Trends in the U.S. by the Research 
Committee on Social Trends (1934, McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc.), “The zoning 
movement . . . began over 30 years ago and today every state and the District of 
Columbia has adopted some form of zoning legislation or regulation.  Since 1916 
when New York City adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance, the decided 
trend has been to integrate zoning with city planning.  Today all but two states 
have comprehensive zoning legislation.”  
Floresta, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
12 CAL GOV’T. CODE § 65350 (West 2011).
13 Metro. Baptist Church v. D.C. Dep’t. of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs—Historic Pres. 
Review Bd., 718 A.2d 119 (D.C. 1998).
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considerations.14
The initial impetuous of zoning laws in California comes from article XI, 
section 7 of the state Constitution, which states in its entirety: “A county or city 
may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary and other 
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”15 Subsequent 
government codes have further identified the powers of local authorities to adopt 
ordinances in furtherance of the above-enumerated powers in order to promote the 
general welfare of society.16 This authority has come to be known as the “police 
powers,” at the state and local level.17 Zoning ordinances, therefore, subject to a 
few exceptions discussed infra, embody a constitutionally legitimate exercise of a 
municipality’s police power.18
The California Government Code not only provides specified authority for 
local municipalities to regulate the use of their land, but also provides the general 
framework for the creation and execution of zoning ordinances.19 This framework 
involves a variety of topics from notice requirements to standards delineating the 
applicability of zoning powers.20 It is analytically important to note that local 
zoning boards and municipalities do not have an inherent authority to regulate the 
usage of land.21  This authority is delegated to the cities and counties from the state 
legislature—which follows, given that cities and counties are the creation of the 
state.22
Despite a seemingly broad grant of power to the towns and cities, subsequent 
decisions have limited the scope of the police powers.  These limits are based on 
common law interpretations of article XI, section 7 of the state Constitution and 
the California Government Code.23 The court’s understanding of what constitutes 
a legitimate use of police power has evolved little over time, but centers on the 
idea that a zoning ordinance is valid if it has a “real or substantial relationship to 
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare” of the municipality.24 This 
understanding of the law was first applied in 1925 by the California Supreme 
                                                          
14 Id.
15 CAL. CONST.  art. XI, § 7. 
16 CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 65000 et seq. (West 2011), also known as The Planning and Zoning Law 
section of the Government Code.  More specifically, § 65850 states in relevant part: “The legislative 
body of any county or city may, pursuant to this chapter, adopt ordinances that do any of the following:
(a) regulate the use of buildings, structures, and land as between industry, business, residences, open 
spaces . . . .”  Id. at § 65850.
17 The term “police power” is commonly used to describe the inherent governmental power to 
enact laws that promote the general welfare of society—within constitutional limits.  In its purest form, 
it is the power to govern.  See generally Graham v. Kingwell, 24 P.2d 488, 489 (Cal. 1933). 
18 Lockard v. City of L.A., 202 P.2d 38 (Cal. 1949). 
19 CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 65000 et seq. (West 2011).
20 Id. 
21 See id. ; see also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
22 See supra note 1; see also Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 
103 (2010).  As the saying goes, or at least should go—the legislature giveth, and the legislature taketh 
away. 
23 Supra note 1; CAL. CONST.  art. XI, § 7. 
24 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420, 439 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting 
Assoc’d. Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976)).
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Court,25 but was adopted shortly after by the United States Supreme Court.26  
Courts maintain severe deference to the local legislatures when determining the 
constitutionality of an ordinance; even going so far as to presume
constitutionality.27
In California, courts have adhered to a path that is so deferential that if there 
is a possibility that reasonable minds could differ on the propriety of an ordinance, 
there will be no judicial interference.28 Nevertheless, a land use ordinance will be 
held invalid if it is found to be arbitrary or unreasonable, possessing no real 
relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the 
community.29 Moreover, a zoning ordinance is only entitled to regulate economic 
competition when its aim is to advance a legitimate public purpose.30
It is also important to consider the area that may be affected by a zoning 
ordinance.31 If the ordinance will affect not just those in a given jurisdiction, but 
perhaps an entire region comprised of multiple jurisdictions, then the court must 
consider the welfare of that entire region.32
B. Nuisance Laws
A “nuisance” is defined as “[a]nything injurious to health . . . or is indecent 
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property so as to 
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . .”33 However, 
“[n]othing which is done or maintained under the express authority of a statute can 
be deemed a nuisance.”34  There are two overarching types of nuisances: those that 
are public and those that are private.  For the purposes of this analysis, the most 
relevant is that of a public nuisance, namely, “one which affects at the same time 
an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of 
persons . . . .”35 Nuisance laws and zoning regulations often overlap, making it 
necessary to discuss them at least to the extent required to understand how they 
                                                          
25 See Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381 (Cal. 1925).
26 See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
27 Lockard v. City of L.A., 202 P.2d 38, 38 (Cal. 1949). 
28 Clemons v. City of L.A., 222 P.2d 439 (Cal. 1950).  Again, the United States Supreme Court has 
promulgated a nearly identical test: “If the validity . . . [is] fairly debatable, the legislative judgment 
must be allowed to control.”  Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. 
29 Home Builders, 557 P.2d at 473.  It is a rare day when a court overturns a local ordinance on the 
grounds that it is unreasonable or arbitrary.  See Desert Turf Club v. Bd. of Supervisors, 296 P.2d 882 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (finding an ordinance banning horse racing in San Bernardino County to be 
arbitrary). 
30 Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 159 P.3d 33, 40–46 (2007).  This is a particularly fragile and 
contentious issue, which could be the subject of an entire article—but for our purposes, the rule as laid 
out by the court in Hernandez is sufficient. 
31 Home Builders, 557 P.2d at 487.
32 Id.  Stating, “the proper constitutional test [of the validity of an ordinance] is one which inquires 
whether the ordinance reasonably relates to those whom it significantly affects.”  Id. 
33 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2011).
34 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482 (West 2011).
35 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 2011).
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affect budding businesses targeted by zoning boards.36
Simply put, there is an immediate relationship between zoning laws and 
prohibiting nuisances.37 However, they are not mutually dependent: the existence 
of a nuisance is no longer necessary for the operation of a zoning ordinance.38 If, 
however, an activity, object, or circumstance is declared to be a nuisance by statute 
or zoning ordinance, then the very existence of that activity, object, or 
circumstance makes it a “nuisance per se,” and thus subject to the applicable 
nuisance laws.39 This information will prove itself relevant when taking a look at 
the steps zoning boards, and in fact the courts themselves, have taken to block the 
establishment of certain businesses within their jurisdictions. 
C. Moratoriums
In the event that the zoning board deems it necessary, an interim ordinance 
may be adopted in order to temporarily halt the creation of new businesses or 
structures.40 This is considered an emergency measure that is also known as a 
moratorium.41 A moratorium creates a temporary ban on the issuance of a certain 
type of permit while the zoning board determines what steps it will take to regulate 
the requested construction or business.42  Generally speaking, a moratorium is used 
when a novel type of business or construction—not foreseen in the city’s “general 
plan”—arrives in the jurisdiction.43  
The ability of a zoning board to implement a moratorium is not universal 
however, and is subject to its own set of limitations.44 Most importantly, an 
interim ordinance is only a temporary solution.  The moratorium is statutorily 
limited to forty-five days, with the option to extend it two more times, up to two 
years.45 The moratorium is used to “protect the public safety, health, and welfare”
by “prohibiting any uses [of land] that may be in conflict with a contemplated 
general plan” while the legislative body studies the topic.46 Again, courts have 
taken a very deferential approach to challenged moratoriums.47
                                                          
36 A comprehensive overview of nuisance laws would be too expansive for this article.
37 See generally Mid-West Emery Freight Sys. v. City of Chi., 257 N.E.2d 127 (Ill. 1970) (holding 
plaintiff failed to overcome the zoning ordinance’s presumption of validity).
38 Beverly Oil Co. v. City of L.A., 254 P.2d 865, 554 (Cal. 1953).  “However, the existence of a 
nuisance is not necessarily the basis on which a zoning ordinance may operate against a particular 
industry.”  Id.
39 Claremont v. Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 10 (Ct. App. 2009).  
40 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65858 (West 2002).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See generally Martin v. Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Ct. App. 1991) (a moratorium 
freezing construction on a hillside property was found to exceed the bounds of § 65858).
44 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65858(b) (West 2002).
45 Id.
46 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65858(a) (West 2002).
47 See generally Assoc’d. Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 486 (Cal. 1976) 
(stating that a challenged zoning decision is presumed to be legitimate); see also Lockard v. City of 
L.A., 202 P.2d 38, 42 (Cal. 1949) (stating that “every intendment is in favor of the validity of such an 
ordinances”).
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III. THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION
“What can a provincial legislature do when [central government] possess the 
exclusive regulation of external and internal commerce?”
-Anonymous Author of Anti-Federalist Number 9
As expressed in part II, article XI, section 7 of the California State 
Constitution, the Government Code and the common law all give local authorities 
an often-surprising amount of leeway in matters of local concern.48 The power, 
however, is not unlimited.49 As previously discussed, any ordinance must be 
reasonable and rational.50 Yet, that is not the end of an ordinance’s limitations.  
Arguably the most powerful form of protection a business owner has against a 
zoning regulation comes from the doctrine of preemption.  Although the zoning 
board is given a wide berth in the regulation of local matters, the power is curbed 
by the concept of state sovereignty, which could limit the applicability of 
ordinances in conflict with state law.51
The over-simplified definition of the doctrine of preemption is that “local 
legislation in conflict with general law is void.”52 This derives directly from the 
very text of article XI, section 7, which again reads: “A county or city may make 
and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary and other ordinances and 
regulations not in conflict with general laws.”53 Nevertheless, this does not truly 
engage the whole picture.  In fact, a conflict arises if the local ordinance 
“duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law.”54  
Because traditionally local governments have always maintained control 
over land-use regulations, the courts will presume that the regulation is not 
preempted by the state legislature.55 The only possibility of overcoming this 
presumption is by showing a clear indication of preemptive intent made by the 
state, or in the alternative, by showing that the legislated material regards only a 
municipal affair.56
                                                          
48 See supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text.
49 Id.
50 See supra note 28.
51 Korean Am. Legal Advocacy Found. v. City of L.A., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 536 (Ct. App. 1994).
52 Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d 1150, 1155 (Cal. 1984). 
53 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (emphasis added). 
54 Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of L.A., 844 P.2d 534, 536 (Cal. 1993).  
55 Compare O’Connell v. City of Stockton, 162 P.3d 583 (Cal. 2007) (ordinance requiring the 
seizing of a vehicle used in the solicitation of prostitution was preempted by state law), with Big Creek 
Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 136 P.3d 821 (Cal. 2006) (ordinance limiting locations of timber 
operations not preempted by state law).  
56 Compare Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005) (determining 
whether or not the state legislature indicated preemptive intent), with Yost v. Thomas, 685 P.2d 1152 
(Cal. 1984) (stating it is “undisputed that in matters of general statewide concern the state may preempt 
local regulation”). 
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A. Express Preemption vs. Implied Preemption
In determining whether or not state law preempts an ordinance, the courts 
apply a three-pronged test.57 First, the court must determine whether or not the 
ordinance duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law.58  
Assuming it does, the court then considers whether the ordinance addresses a 
municipal issue or a statewide concern.59  In the event that the ordinance addresses
a statewide matter, then the court must next consider whether or not the state 
legislature expressly or implicitly indicated preemptive intent in enacting the 
statute with which it conflicts.60 Alternatively, if the question addressed by the 
ordinance is found to be one of local concern, then the court, bound by article XI, 
section 5 of the California State Constitution, will find the ordinance supersedes 
state law.61
Determining if the local ordinance is in conflict with state law is the first 
step.62 Duplication of state law occurs when an ordinance is “coextensive,” or 
purports to impose the same prohibition that the general law imposes.63 Next, an 
ordinance contradicts state law when it cannot be reconciled with state law.64  
Finally, a local ordinance can come into conflict with state law when it enters a 
field fully occupied by state law either through the expressed intent of the 
legislature to fully occupy the legal area, or through implicit intent.65 Broken 
down, a local ordinance is in conflict with the general laws when it duplicates, is 
irreconcilable with, or enters a field fully occupied by, state law.66
In the event that a conflict is found to exist, article XI, section 5 of the state 
constitution vests local municipalities with the authority to supersede all other 
inconsistent laws respecting municipal affairs.67 Put differently, if the matter in 
question is merely a local issue—and not one of statewide concern—then the local 
                                                          
57 See O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 586–88; see also Am. Fin. Servs., 104 P.3d at 820–21.
58 O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 587.
59 Supra notes 52–52 and accompanying text.
60 Id.
61 Id. Article XI, section 5(a) states:
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed 
thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to 
municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in their 
several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general 
laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any 
existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws 
inconsistent therewith.
Id. (emphasis added). 
62 O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 587
63 Id. (quoting Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of L.A., 844 P.2d 534, 536 (Cal. 1993)).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Duplication of state law is the easiest to identify, as it is essentially self-explanatory.  If a local 
ordinance prohibits or requires what state law already prohibits or requires, then it is duplicative.  
Irreconcilable is the opposite of duplication: namely, that a local ordinance cannot require an action 
which state law prohibits, or visa-versa.  Finally, and most complex, a local ordinance cannot enter a 
field fully occupied by state law. See id. This last factor is explored infra.
67 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5. 
224 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. V:II
ordinance concerning such a question controls, even over state law.68 This has 
come to be known as the “Home Rule.”69 The court’s interpretation of this rule 
has changed drastically over time.70 Although the original understanding of a 
“municipal affair” was expansive, the California Supreme Court has slowly 
chipped away at what a local legislature can call sovereign legal territory.71 This 
has not occurred without dissent among the courts.72  
Having determined that the ordinance touches upon issues of statewide 
concern, and is not simply addressing a municipal affair, the court will then move 
on to the third part of the preemption test: whether the state legislature had 
intended for the statute to preempt local ordinances.73 The courts recognize both 
expressed and implicit intent.74 Expressed intent is the most efficient method for 
any party hoping to prove that a local ordinance is invalid under the doctrine of 
preemption.75  The most common form of expressed intent is a direct contradiction 
between the local ordinance and the statute because it is clear that if the state 
legislature said something that specifically conflicts with the ordinance, then it 
expressly dominates that point of law.76 Consider the ruling in Piploy v. Benson, 
where the court suggested that “[w]here a statute and an ordinance are identical it 
is obvious that the field sought to be covered by the ordinance has already been 
occupied by state legislation.”77
Nevertheless, expressed intent is difficult to establish given the state 
legislature’s “intention to provide only a minimum of limitation in order that
counties and cities may exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning 
                                                          
68 See Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990, 994 (Cal. 1992).
69 Id. at 993–95.
70 For a more detailed analysis of this evolution, Chief Justice Lucas provides a brief overview of 
the history of the Home Rule in California in Johnson. Id. at 993–95.  Although the courts had found 
that the legislature intended to vest local government with police power over local affairs at the outset 
of the California Constitution, the only way to guarantee that power was through an amendment to the
constitution.  Id.  As a result, from 1896 to 1968, multiple amendments were made to the Constitution 
in an effort to clarify and solidify the Home Rule, resulting in article XI, section 5.  Id. at 994–95.
71 Compare Bishop v. City of San Jose, 460 P.2d 137, 144 (Cal. 1969) (“The fact, standing alone, 
that the Legislature has attempted to deal with a particular subject on a statewide basis is not 
determinative of the issue as between state and municipal affairs.”), with O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 587 
(finding that although a matter may be a municipal concern, state Legislature involvement in the matter 
makes it a statewide concern).  Further, the court has said, “[t]he common thread of the cases is that if 
there is a significant local interest to be served which may differ from one locality to another then the 
presumption favors the validity of the local ordinance against an attack of state preemption.”  Gluck v. 
County of L.A., 155 Cal. Rptr. 435, 441 (Ct. App. 1979). 
72 See O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 593–96 (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
73 Id. at 587–88.  An analogous test is well founded in federal law: “When Congress legislates in a 
field traditionally occupied by the States, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic police powers 
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.’”  Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 429 (Cal. 2004) (quoting California v. 
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989)).
74 See Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 136 P.3d 821, 828–33 (Cal. 2006) 
(analyzing both expressed and implicit intent).
75 See generally id.
76 Contradiction, as discussed above, occurs when an ordinance cannot be reconciled with state 
law.  Supra note 61.
77 Piploy v. Benson, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (Cal. 1942). 
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matters.”78 It is therefore rare, but not unheard of, for civil legislation to specify 
its intention to dominate the legal landscape.79
Otherwise, the courts can look to the implied intent of the legislature.80  
There are three indicia of the intent to fully occupy the area of law that the courts 
have consistently recognized.81 First, “the subject matter has been so fully and 
completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become 
exclusively a matter of state concern.”82 Second, “the subject matter has been 
partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a 
paramount state concern will not tolerate future or additional legal action.”83  
Finally, “the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the 
subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the 
transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefits to the locality.”84
In determining implied preemption, the court is not to look merely at the 
words, but at the totality of circumstances surrounding the statute.85  This includes, 
but is not limited to, the history behind the law in conjunction with its language 
and scope, as well as the history behind that form of regulation.86  
In O’Connell, the court recognized a split among the appellate districts in 
determining what does and does not constitute a municipal affair.87 There, an 
ordinance was passed in Stockton, which provided for the forfeiture of “any 
vehicle used to solicit an act of prostitution, or to acquire or attempt to acquire any 
controlled substance” in the city.88 O’Connell challenged the law, seeking an 
injunction, claiming, in part, that the law was preempted by state laws governing 
vehicle forfeitures.89  The court agreed.90  Applying the three-pronged analysis, the 
                                                          
78 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65800 (West 2008).
79 See Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. City of L.A., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 38, 43–45 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding 
that by including the phrase “it is the intent of the Legislature to occupy the whole field of health and 
sanitation standards for retail food facilities” the legislature created an expressed intent to fully occupy 
the field).  See also Big Creek Lumber, 136 P.3d at 827–32.  It is much more common in criminal law to 
find a contradiction (and therefore expressed intent), given that any local ordinance that seeks to 
establish a punishment inimical to one prescribed by state law will be found to be conflict with it.  
Compare In re Portnoy, 131 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1942) (local legislation imposed the same criminal 
prohibition as the general law—therefore conflicts), with Ex Parte Daniels, 192 P. 442 (Cal. 1920) 
(finding a contradiction in laws when a local ordinance set the speed limit below that set by the state). 
80 Big Creek Lumber, 136 P.3d at 832.
81 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 820 (Cal. 2005).
82 Id. 
83 Id.
84 Id. “The denial of power to a local body when the state has preempted the field is not based 
solely upon the superior authority of the state.  It is a rule of necessity, based upon the need to prevent 
dual regulations that could result in uncertainty and confusion.”  Abbott v. City of L.A. 349 P.2d 974, 
979 (Cal. 1960). 
85 Am. Fin. Servs., 104 P.3d at 820–21
86 Id.  “Where the legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular subject matter, its intent 
with regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local regulation is not to be measured alone by 
the language used but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme.”  Tolman v. Underhill, 
249 P.2d 280, 283 (Cal. 1952). 
87 O’Connell v. City of Stockton, 162 P.3d 583, 586 (Cal. 2007). 
88 Id. at 588.
89 Id. at 585. 
90 Id. at 593.
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court determined that the state had addressed questions of vehicular forfeiture 
through multiple provisions of the state’s Penal and Vehicle Codes, “leaving no 
room for further regulation at the local level.”91 This meant that (1) the ordinance 
was in conflict with general law because it had entered a field fully occupied by 
the state; (2) the law was made a statewide concern via the state legislature’s
involvement; and (3) that the legislature had implicitly preempted local ordinances 
concerning the same topic.92
Analogously, in American Financial Services, the court was asked to 
determine if an Oakland ordinance regulating predatory lending practices in the 
local home mortgage market was preempted by a state law enacted to achieve the 
same thing.93  The court applied the same three-pronged analysis: determining first 
and foremost that the ordinance was in conflict with general law by entering an 
area occupied by the state.94 Next, the court questioned whether or not predatory 
lending practices were a statewide concern or a municipal affair.  The court found 
that the “regulation of predatory practices in mortgage lending is one of statewide 
concern.”95 Therefore, the court examined the circumstances surrounding the 
statute, as well as the language of the statute itself to determine if the legislature 
had intended for the statute to preempt local ordinances.96 In doing so, the court 
found that the state law was comprehensive and detailed in its scope, and that 
historically, the area of regulating home mortgages was dominated by the state.97  
These factors led the court to the conclusion that the California legislature had 
intended for the state law to supersede local ordinances.98
B. The Right to Abate Nuisance
Local municipalities maintain the authority to abate nuisances, and can do so 
through its police powers.99 As a result, no business has a vested right to conduct 
itself in a manner that the city constitutes a nuisance.100 Like every other power 
discussed thus far, the ability to regulate, as a nuisance, any activity or business is 
limited: zoning regulations cannot prohibit what the state has expressly 
authorized.101 This, again, is an over simplification.  A board of supervisors may 
exclude, on certain grounds, a business from parts of their jurisdiction, or even 
from the entire jurisdiction given the right circumstances.102  However, the “certain 
                                                          
91 Id. at 592.
92 Id.
93 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 815 (Cal. 2005).
94 Id. at 820–23.
95 Id. at 820.
96 Id. at 820–23.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 823. 
99 City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 131 (Ct. App. 1996). 
100 Id.
101 See Desert Turf Club v. Board of Supervisors, 296 P.2d 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956). 
102 Compare Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 886 (finding the outright ban of horse racing tracks an 
overextension of zoning powers), with Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420, 
421–22 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding an outright ban of “big-box retailers” constitutionally acceptable). 
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grounds” requirement is a reference to the necessity that the outright ban be based 
on some reasonable zoning concern, in the same manner utilized in restricting 
manufacturing establishments in residential zones.103 What a board of supervisors 
cannot do is effectuate a ban of a business on strictly moral or personal grounds.104
In practice, what this means is that through zoning, a municipality cannot 
ban outright an industry because the zoning commission finds the industry 
offensive, or because members of the board have a financial stake in disallowing 
it.105 Yet, a business can be banned from an entire jurisdiction if there are 
legitimate grounds that satisfy the requirements discussed earlier; namely, that the 
ordinance is reasonable and not arbitrary, furthering the health and welfare of the 
community at large.106 Consider two cases.  In the first, Desert Turf Club, the 
board of supervisors in Riverside County passed an ordinance banning from the 
county all horse racing tracks, even though through referendum the people had 
given the power of regulating horse racing to the state legislature.107 In the other, 
Wal-Mart Stores, the board of supervisors for the City of Turlock banned all “big-
box retailers” from the jurisdiction, even though under state law, “big-box 
retailers” were legal.108 The two courts came to two very different conclusions 
regarding whether or not the local ordinances overstepped their bounds.  In Desert 
Turf Club, the court found the ordinance violated the preemption doctrine,109 while 
in Wal-Mart Stores the court found that state law did not preempt the ordinance.110
In the first case, the court determined that the people, through referendum 
and in conjunction with the state legislature, had clearly intended to “fully occupy”
the legal field of horse racing.111 As a result, the ordinance was preempted.112  
Conversely, in Wal-Mart Stores, the court found that there was no sign, implicit or 
expressed, that the ordinance overstepped its bounds.113
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF MARIJUANA DISPENSARIES
“That is not a drug.  It’s a leaf.”
-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
California became the first state to legalize the use of marijuana for 
                                                          
103 See Wal-Mart Stores, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 440–41. 
104 See Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 886. 
105 Id.
106 Supra notes 22–30. 
107 Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 883–84. 
108 Wal-Mart Stores, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 421–22. 
109 Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 888 (“As it appears to us that the Board of Supervisors based its 
actions on an erroneous conclusion as to its legal rights and duties, and that upon the record legitimately 
before it the Board acted in abuse of its discretion, a writ of mandate should issue.”).
110 Wal-Mart Stores, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 438. 
111 Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 450–51. 
112 Id.
113 Wal-Mart Stores, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 438–39. 
228 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. V:II
medicinal purposes in 1996.114 This was accomplished through Proposition 215, 
also known as the Compassionate Use Act (CUA), which won a majority of the 
public vote,115 and paved the way for thirteen other states to enact similar laws.116  
The CUA was codified as Health and Safety Code section 11362.5 and was created 
to, among other things, “ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to 
obtain and use marijuana for medicinal purposes,” and “to ensure that patients and 
their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana . . . are not subject to 
criminal prosecution or sanction.”117
Early critics of the proposition claimed that the language contained within 
the four corners of the law was too vague.118 The subsequent data may now prove 
that prediction accurate, as there are an estimated 200,000 Californians who have 
received a prescription for marijuana.119 But the largest problems did not come 
from some sudden influx of marijuana; instead, the largest hurdles created by 
Proposition 215 came from its implementation.120 There were no clear guidelines 
explaining how patients could receive the drug, nor was there guidance to law 
enforcement regarding how to tell the difference between a legitimate user and 
someone using the drug illegally.121 This vagueness resulted in multiple cases 
arriving at the appellate level, as citizens and law enforcement grappled with what 
to make of the new legal landscape.122
Realizing these issues, the California legislature introduced and enacted 
Senate Bill 420 in an effort to solve the many problems created by Proposition 215 
(later codified in the California Health and Safety Code).123 The bill, titled the 
                                                          
114 Patrick Stack, A Brief History of Medical Marijuana, TIME MAGAZINE (Oct. 21, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1931247,00.html.
115 Bill Jones, Cal. Sec’y of State, Supplement Statement of Vote 102 (Nov. 5, 1996), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/1996-general/1996-general-ssov.pdf.  The CUA was passed with 
approximately 55% of the vote.  Id.
116 Patricia Salkin, Medical Marijuana Meets Zoning: Can You Grow, Sell, and Smoke That Here?,
62 PLAN. & ENVTL. L.  No. 8, 3 (2010).  These states are: Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, 
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and 
Washington.  Id.
117 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996).  
118 Scott Imler & Stephen Gutwillig, Medical Marijuana in California: A History, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/features/health/la-oew-gutwillig-imler6-2009mar06,0,2951626. 
story.  In fact, Senator Diane Feinstein reportedly said that Proposition 215 was so poorly written, 
“you’ll be able to drive a truckload of marijuana through the holes in it.”  Id.
119 Id.
120 Tammy McCabe, It’s High Time: California Attempts to Clear the Smoke Surrounding The 
Compassionate Use Act, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 545, 549 (2004) (there was no guidance within the 
new law providing for the structure of dispensaries or co-ops). 
121 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996).  See also McCabe, supra note 120, at 
549. 
122 See People v. Urziceanu, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 873 (Ct. App. 2005) (explaining, “the 
Compassionate Use Act is a narrowly drafted statement designed to allow a qualified patient and his or 
her primary caregiver to possess and cultivate marijuana for the patient’s personal use despite penal 
laws that outlaw these two acts for all others”); People v. Mower, 49 P.3d 1067 (2002) (holding that the 
medical-marijuana defense offers only limited immunity, rather than complete immunity from criminal 
prosecution); People v. Rigo, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating, “the acts of selling, giving 
away, transporting, and growing large quantities of marijuana remain criminal”).
123 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7 (West 2004).  The Statutory Notes state that 
following the implementation of the CUA, “reports from across the state have revealed problems and 
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Medical Marijuana Protection Act (MMPA), had the expressed intention of solving 
the problems created by the CUA,124 and in some respects succeeded.125 First, the 
bill defined key terms, which had become controversial following the passage of 
the CUA.126 This included defining what constituted an illness justifying the 
prescription of marijuana, and who could be considered a patient.127 Next, the 
MMPA tackled criminal liability by limiting the criminal liability of a qualified 
patient.128  
Most importantly, however, the MMPA laid the foundation for storefront 
dispensaries.129  Although initially vague, section 11362.81, subdivision (d), of the 
MMPA provides that, “the Attorney General shall develop and adopt appropriate 
guidelines to ensure the security and nondiversion of marijuana grown for medical 
use by patients qualified under the Compassionate Use Act.”130 This instruction 
led to the “Guidelines for the Security and Non-Diversion of Marijuana Grown for 
Medical Use,” released on August 25, 2008 (herein Guidelines).131 The 
Guidelines are not legally binding, but the document does hold considerable legal 
weight.132
The Guidelines explain that the only legally permissible business models 
entitled to engage in the distribution of marijuana are cooperatives and 
collectives.133 All cooperatives must be properly organized and registered as a 
corporation under the Corporations or Food and Agricultural Codes, and file 
articles of incorporation with the state.134 The attorney general later defines a 
cooperative corporation as “democratically controlled and are not organized to 
make a profit for themselves, as such, or for their members, as such, but primarily 
for their members as patrons.”135 Although California law does not recognize 
collectives as an independent business entity, the Guidelines explain, “a collective 
should be an organization that merely facilitates the collaborative efforts of patient 
                                                          
uncertainties in the Act that have impeded the ability of law enforcement officers to enforce its 
provisions as the voters intended.” Id.
124 Id.
125 Scott Imler, supra note 118 (“I would consider SB420 a qualified success”).
126 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7(h) (West 2004).  
127 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.7(a), (h) (West 2004).  
128 Id. (specifically, individuals “shall not be subject, on that sole basis” to liability under Health 
and Safety Code section 11357 (possession), section 11358 (cultivation), section 11359 (possession for 
sale), section 11360 (transportation, sale, distribution), section 11366 (opening or maintaining an 
unlawful place), section 11366.5 (providing a place for unlawful acts involving controlled substances), 
and section 11570 (nuisance)). See McCabe, supra note 120 n.43. 
129 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.81(d) (West 2004).  
130 Id. 
131 Edmund G. Brown, Cal. State Att’y General, Guidelines for the Security and Non-Diversion of 
Marijuana Grown for Medical Use, (Aug. 2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/
pdfs/n1601_medicalmarijuanaguidelines.pdf.
132 Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 98 (Ct. App. 2010)  (quoting 
Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Employees Retirement System, 863 P.2d 218, 223 (Cal. 1993)). 
133 Brown, supra note 131. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE § 12201 (West 2011)).
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and caregiver members – including the allocation of costs and revenues.”136
Following the publication of the attorney general’s guidelines, it became 
clear that, under state law, marijuana dispensaries would be permissible so long as 
they operated on a not-for-profit basis and that the dispensaries operated on a 
closed loop system.137 In other words, the marijuana had to come from the 
members of the group, and could only be sold to the members of the group.138  
Outsiders would not be allowed into the closed system, unless eligible under the 
MMPA.139  
It matters not, then, if the cooperative corporation or the collective has a 
storefront.140 In fact, to clarify the issue further, the attorney general points out 
that while, “dispensaries, as such, are not recognized under the law . . . a properly 
organized and operated collective or cooperative that dispenses medical marijuana 
through a storefront may be lawful . . . .”141 This is an important revelation for the 
owners of the approximately 966 store front dispensaries scattered throughout Los 
Angeles.142
V. WHEN ZONING AUTHORITY CLASHES WITH STATE & FEDERAL LAW
“There seems to be no public policy purpose for [that] zoning.  This whole thing 
just smacks of special interest politics.”
-Ken Thompson, Co-Creator of Google’s Programming Language
Whenever a new and perhaps contentious land use request is filed with a 
local zoning authority, it is common for planning commissions to enact a 
moratorium in an effort to buy some time in order to determine how to handle the 
permitting.143 Because these moratoria are temporary solutions, it is only a matter 
of time before a final zoning decision is handed down.144 Although the power of 
local municipalities to regulate land usage within their jurisdiction seems to be 
expansive, it does have its limits.  Those limits have scarcely ever been tested as 
consistently (and with as much aggression) as they have in the face of the 
                                                          
136 Id. The attorney general further relies on the dictionary to define a collective, stating, “the 
dictionary defines them as ‘a business, farm, etc. jointly owned and operated by the members of a 
group.’”  Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. 
140 See generally id.
141 Id. The attorney general provides an example of a dispensary acting unlawfully: “dispensaries 
that merely require patients to complete a form summarily designating the business owner as their 
primary caregiver – and then offering marijuana in exchange for cash ‘donations’ – are likely 
unlawful.”  Id.
142 Doug Smith & Thomas Suh Lauder, Where’s the Weed? Mapping LA’s Marijuana 
Dispensaries, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2009), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/09/medical-
marijuana-in-los-angeles.html.
143 See City of Corona v. Naulls, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2008). 
144 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65858 (West 2002). 
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explosion of storefront dispensaries.145 This section will examine the ways 
business owners have attempted to circumvent local planning commissions in an 
effort to start a business, and how, on occasion, they have succeeded. 
A. Preemption by State Statute 
The driving force behind preemption is the concept of state sovereignty, but 
as discussed supra in Part II, the implied power of preemption is not without its 
limits.146  The court has set up factors to consider in determining whether or not an 
ordinance is preempted,147 and has applied them in multiple recent decisions 
regarding a myriad of regulations discussed below. 
In Big Creek Lumber, the County of Santa Cruz passed zoning ordinances 
restricting permissible locations of timber operations to specified zones within the 
county.148 A lumber company subsequently challenged the ordinances, claiming 
the ordinances were preempted by the Z’berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 
(a state law).149  The court determined that, within the Act, the state legislature had 
expressed its intention to preempt local regulations regarding the conduct of timber 
harvesting, but not the location.150 Further, the court said, “by expressly 
preempting local regulations targeting the conduct of timber operations . . . [the 
Forest Practice Act] implicitly permits local regulations addressed to other aspects 
of timber operations.”151 Essentially, the court found that the Forest Practice Act 
only regulated the “how” and not the “where,” and in doing so, implied that local 
municipalities had the authority to regulate the “where.”152
Conversely, in California Grocers, the court determined that state Health and 
Safety Codes preempted a Los Angeles ordinance.153 The ordinance in question 
required purchasers of large grocery stores to employ the pre-existing staff for at 
least 90 days following the acquisition.154 The court found, however, that the 
ordinance was being used to maintain health and safety standards, which was 
expressly preempted by the California Retail Food Code (CRFC).155 When 
                                                          
145 “Explosion” is used to describe the rapid increase of dispensaries in Los Angeles over the past 
four years—leveling off at approximately 1,000 dispensaries (outnumbering Starbucks in some 
neighborhoods).  Madalite Del Barco, In California, Marijuana Dispensaries Outnumber Starbucks,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 15, 2009),  http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
113822156.
146 See supra notes 21–30. 
147 See supra notes 56–92. 
148 Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 136 P.3d 821, 824 (Cal. 2006); see also CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 4511 (West 2011). 
149 Big Creek Lumber, 136 P.3d at 824.
150 Id. at 828–31.
151 Id.
152 Id. 
153 Cal. Grocers Ass’n. v. City of L.A., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 37–38 (Ct. App. 2009), rev’d 254 P.3d 
1019 (Cal. 2011).
154 Id. 
155 Id. In order to make this determination, the court examined the legislative history of the 
ordinance, the comments made by legislators during debate, as well as the language of the ordinance 
itself.  Id.
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enacting the CRFC, the legislature expressly declared that, “it is the intent of the 
Legislature to occupy the whole field of health and sanitation standards for retail 
food facilities.”156 Given this expressed preemptive intent, the court determined 
that the Los Angeles ordinance was preempted by state law.157
In both of these situations, the courts have turned to the content of the statute 
and the intentions of the legislature.158 When there is not direct language 
indicating preemptive intent, as there was in California Grocers, the courts must 
rely on what the legislators intended when enacting the law.159 The MMPA does 
not speak to the topic of preemption.160 Nevertheless the fact that the stated 
purpose of the Act was to “promote uniform and consistent application of the act 
among the counties within the state,” must be taken into consideration by the 
courts when deciding what the legislature intended.161  Here, the legislature clearly 
intended to create a uniform, statewide, set of guidelines for the implementation of 
the CUA. 
B. Preemption by Referendum
The California Constitution provides for the creation of initiative statutes or 
referendums through popular vote.162 This process requires that proponents of a 
proposed ordinance submit an initiative petition signed by the requisite number of 
voters, at which time the proposed ordinance can be placed to a public vote.163  
The initiative process can be utilized for those seeking to change state, county, or 
city laws.164 Because it is one of the few examples of the people voting directly 
for a law—instead of electing representatives who vote for laws on the people’s
behalf—it is perhaps one of the only vestiges of a direct democracy in the federal 
system. 
In determining whether a state law preempts a local ordinance, courts have 
paid an increased amount of deference towards those laws, which have been 
enacted directly by the people.165 In Desert Turf Club, discussed supra, the court 
                                                          
156 Id. at 38.
157 Id. at 45. 
158 Id. at 38, 44–45.
159 Supra notes 73–79. 
160 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7 (West 2004). 
161 Id. The legislative notes states in relevant part: 
It is the intent of the Legislature, therefore, to do all of the following: (1) Clarify 
the scope of the application of the act and facilitate the prompt identification of 
qualified patients and their designated primary caregivers in order to avoid 
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Id. (emphasis added). 
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Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers 
of initiative and referendum.” Id.
163 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9101 (West 2003). 
164 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
165 See Desert Turf Club v. Board of Supervisors, 296 P.2d 882, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
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recognized the added legal weight of a law passed by popular vote and questioned 
whether, “a board of supervisors [can] overrule the act of the people of the state in 
adopting a constitutional amendment and the legislature of the state in passing a 
full and comprehensive plan for the licensing and control by forbidding on moral 
grounds what the state expressly permits?”166 The court found the answer to quite 
simply be “no.”167  
The similarities between marijuana dispensaries and horse racing tracks are 
fairly numerous. First, medicinal marijuana was decriminalized in 1996 by 
initiative,168 just as horse racing was legalized in 1933 by amendment.169 Second, 
in both cases following legalization, the legislature instituted a more 
comprehensive plan to carry out the will of the people.170 Third, following 
implementation of both the initiative and the subsequent legislative plan, 
individual counties and cities attempted to ban outright, through zoning, both 
marijuana dispensaries and horse racing.171  
In Desert Turf Club, the court managed to walk a thin line.  The court 
determined that a local municipality could ban horseracing tracks—even after a 
statewide initiative passed, permitting them—but could only do so while acting in 
good faith, and not arbitrarily or unreasonably.172  In other words, the zoning board 
must simply work within the confines of the authority granted to it, and thus avoid 
banning something based only on personal beliefs or moral opposition.173  Yet, if a 
zoning board found legitimate zoning concerns, it would be justified in banning a 
certain business or activity even after a public referendum condoned that very 
activity or business.174
For marijuana dispensaries this is an ominous realization.  Although the 
courts have made it clear that every business is safe from zoning boards that 
function with an ulterior, moral agenda that does not mean that such zoning boards 
are powerless.175 Based solely on the reasonableness standard, a city planning 
commission need only provide a plausible reason for banning a business.176  Given 
the current nature of the medical marijuana industry, the “reasonableness” standard 
is not a particularly difficult standard to meet.177
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168 Stack, supra note 114.
169 CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25.5 (repealed 1966).
170 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7 (West 2004) created the MMPA, while CAL. BUS. &
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Memorandum from Richard Doyle, City Attorney, and Robert L. Davies, Chief of Police to Honorable 
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176 See Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420, 438–39 (Ct. App. 2006).
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C. Preemption by Federal Law
Multiple attempts have been made by opponents of medical marijuana 
dispensaries to argue that the city must act in compliance with federal law—as 
opposed to state law—because federal law preempts state law.178 This argument 
was actually not addressed until very recently in Qualified Patients Association, 
when the court answered the question directly.179 It serves an important purpose, 
however, to first understand the nature of the claim. 
City councils have claimed that because the federal Controlled Substance 
Act criminalized marijuana, it is a violation of federal law for a local government 
to authorize the existence of medical marijuana dispensaries.180  Fearing 
prosecution, cities have opted to side with the federal government as opposed to 
complying with state law.181 This logic was dismissed first in City of Garden 
Grove, and then later in Qualified Patients Association.182 In this area the 
appellate courts have made two significant findings.  First, the courts found that 
federal law did not preempt California’s marijuana laws.183 The court determined 
that “no conflict arises based on the fact that Congress has chosen to prohibit the 
possession of medical marijuana while California has chosen not to.”184 This 
means that the MMPA does not require anything that the Controlled Substances 
Act forbids.185 The court went further, pointing out that the federal Controlled 
Substances Act does not direct local governments regarding zoning power in any 
way, and consequently, a local government’s compliance with state law does not 
violate federal law.186 What this means is the fact that an individual or collective 
corporation chooses to act in a way that violates federal but not state law, does not 
alone relay liability unto the municipality.187 As a result, federal law does not 
                                                          
a moratorium on dispensaries.  L.A. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, RECOMMENDATION REPORT, CPC 
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their obligations under the state marijuana laws.”  Id.
187 Id.
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preempt California’s medical marijuana laws.188
D. Criminalization
In some situations, local municipalities have gone so far as to criminalize 
certain businesses or groups, even while under state law the business or activity is 
valid.189 In Qualified Patients Association, the City of Anaheim enacted an 
ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to own, operate, or be employed by a 
medical marijuana dispensary.190 The ordinance was contrary to the MMPA, 
enacted by the state legislature as Senate Bill No. 420, and the CUA, which had 
decriminalized medicinal marijuana, cooperative corporations, and collectives.191  
Anaheim argued that California’s dispensary laws were preempted by the federal 
Controlled Substances Act, and therefore, was inapplicable to local 
municipalities.192 Qualified Patients Association, a medicinal marijuana 
dispensary operating within Anaheim, sought a declaratory judgment that the 
state’s marijuana laws preempted Anaheim’s ordinance.193 The trial court granted 
Anaheim’s demurrer, but an appellate court reversed the demurrer and remanded 
the case back to the trial courts, putting off the discussion of state preemption until 
adequately adjudicated.194  
Because of this ruling there remains the question of state preemption—
specifically, can Anaheim criminalize dispensaries without regard for state law? 
The appellate court had hinted at the answer before overturning the lower court’s
demurrer and remanding for further proceedings.  The appellate court said, “it 
seems odd the [state] Legislature would disagree with federal policymakers . . . but 
intend that local legislatures could side with their federal—instead of state—
counterparts in prohibiting and criminalizing . . . medical marijuana activities.  
After all, local entities are creatures of the state, not the federal government.”195
Picking up on this “hint,” Judge Caffee of the Superior Court of Orange 
County ruled that state law preempted the portion of Anaheim’s ordinance that 
criminalized medical marijuana dispensaries.196  The Superior Court found that the 
goal of the CUA to protect qualified patients from criminal liability was in direct 
conflict of Anaheim’s ordinance.197 However, the Superior Court also found that 
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236 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. V:II
the CUA and MMPA do not fully occupy the field of law surrounding marijuana 
dispensaries, and that the state legislature intended to allow local governments to 
address the issue more fully.198  The ability to regulate dispensaries into oblivion is 
within the powers of local governments.199 As a result, Judge Caffee severed the 
criminal portion of the ordinance, but ruled that the remaining portions were 
valid.200 What this means in a real world context is that dispensaries are still not 
allowed in Anaheim, but opening one or working in one is not grounds for criminal 
liability—the city will simply shut it down, or not issue a business permit to begin 
with.
VI. IMPACT
“The Chief Business of the American People is Business”
-President Calvin Coolidge
The current legal issues facing medicinal marijuana dispensaries may seem 
like a distant plight to most businesses, but that understanding of the issue could be 
dangerously short-sighted.  Instead, the power of local governments to ban outright 
entire business models that are otherwise legal should be a very real concern.  The 
Home Rule was designed to decentralize power away from Sacramento and into 
the hands of local legislatures,201 but courts have failed to delineate clearly where 
one authority ends and the other begins.  As a result, zoning commissions often 
find themselves in legal battles to determine whether or not they have overstepped 
their authority. 
A. Impact on Dispensaries
At the most basic level, criminalization by local governments of an expressly 
sanctioned business goes too far.  It seems clear that the appellate court and the 
superior court’s observation in Qualified Patients Association was keen: it is 
categorically illogical for the state legislature to expressly decriminalize a 
business, with the intention that local governments be allowed to disregard the 
law.202 Local governments are nothing but an extension of the state legislature; 
they were created at Sacramento’s whim and therefore dictated by the laws of the 
land.203  
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Criminalization moves beyond an act of mere zoning.  It is clear that a local 
municipality is authorized to zone in a manner dictated by statute and common 
law—namely in a way that is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary;204 however the 
act of criminalizing dispensaries steps far beyond these confines.  In Qualified 
Patients Association, the City of Anaheim argued that they were complying with 
federal law by criminalizing medical marijuana dispensaries.205 This, however, is 
not an accurate depiction of the function of local government.  Local government 
is designed to carry out the will of the state legislature.206 It could be argued that 
local governments are also designed to give a voice to the individual communities 
who may wish to fashion their community as they see fit.  Proponents of this view 
point would likely argue that it should therefore be left up to the local governing 
agencies to determine the layout and content of the community.  This argument, 
however, ignores the realities of our federalist system.  Decentralized power within 
the state—as within the country—is not the equivalent of a freestanding 
government.  As each locality is the creation of the state, each is therefore 
beholden to the state so as to create a uniform set of rules and regulations.207  
Local criminalization of marijuana dispensaries in defiance of a state law that 
expressly legalized the same is therefore overreaching and unjustified.  The court 
in Qualified Patients Association ruled accordingly. 
Most localities, however, have relied not on criminalization, but on 
moratoria and zoning.  When enacted correctly, zoning regulations and moratoria 
affecting dispensaries have been upheld in multiple instances throughout the 
state.208 Distance restrictions, moratoria, and express limits on the number of 
dispensaries are all legitimate uses of a local government’s police powers.209 The 
process goes awry, however, if local officials attempt to ban the businesses 
outright based solely upon personal feelings harbored towards dispensaries.210 In 
these situations, courts must not be timid in the protection of these dispensaries by 
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applying the precedent set forth in Desert Turf Club,211 as zoning commissions are
simply not entitled to act arbitrarily. 
Nevertheless, through preemption, dispensaries may be able to escape the 
powerful zoning commissions.  Although the Home Rule places authority in the 
hands of zoning boards to handle municipal affairs, this power does not give local 
municipalities the ability to regulate anything that occurs within their jurisdiction 
without regard for what occurs outside of it.  Instead, the courts evolving 
understanding of the Home Rule reveals a weaker delineation of power than 
originally defined.212 In Polis v. City of La Palma, the court ruled that state 
preemption of a local ordinance is likely to exist where there was not “a significant 
local interest to be served that may differ from one locality to another.”213  In other 
words, if the ordinance in question regards an issue occupied by state law, and that 
issue is essentially static from one municipality to the next, then the state law 
regarding that issue would sufficiently occupy that field of law, leaving no room 
for further regulation at the municipal level.  
If this proposition is correct, then the threat stemming from the subject of the 
ordinance is no more severe from one municipality to the next, and the city cannot 
justify an expansion or restriction of the state law.214 Assume arguendo that 
dispensaries operating within the confines of the law are no less and no more 
dangerous in Anaheim than they are in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Humboldt 
County, or Fresno.  It follows then, that there is no justification for the limitation of 
the applicability of state law from city to city.  Under this understanding, 
dispensaries sanctioned by state law should not be subjected to unnecessarily 
restrictive local ordinances that differ from locality to locality.
Further, when looking to determine whether the MMPA or the CUA 
expressly or implicitly preempts a local ordinance, the courts should consider the 
legislative notes following the text of the MMPA itself.  Although there is no 
expressed preemptive intent within the MMPA, the legislative notes clearly state 
that the goal of the legislature was to create a uniform set of guidelines.215 This is 
a straightforward, unambiguous expression of preemptive intent.  The legislature 
has made it clear that the rules and guidelines set forth in the MMPA are designed 
for statewide application.  The goal was to avoid the very patchwork of regulation 
that local ordinances have since created.
Alternatively, note that nothing within the CUA or the MMPA compels cities 
and counties to accommodate dispensaries.216 If the courts chose not to adhere to 
the legislative notes, the strongest argument available to dispensary owners hoping 
to overturn an unduly burdensome zoning restriction still lies within the court’s
existing preemption test.  In determining preemption, courts consider the three 
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distinct indicia of implied preemption discussed above.217 The third indicium 
states, “the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the 
subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the 
transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefits to the locality.”218  
This is a dispensary owner’s most cogent argument.  Because cooperative 
corporations and collectives exist for the sole purpose of providing a state 
recognized medication to legitimate patients, an ordinance which forbids the sale 
of this medication would invariably affect transient patients. 
Taking the court’s third indicium in pieces, it is clear that the subject matter 
has been partially covered by state law: the MMPA and the CUA both pertain to 
medical marijuana, and the MMPA deals directly with patients and their 
caregivers.219 The second clause requires that harm to transient citizens caused by 
the ordinance outweigh the benefits to the locality.220 The harm to legitimate 
patients who use marijuana to treat their symptoms appears to be severe.221  In real 
terms, this is tantamount to a municipality banning pain medication to injured 
athletes, and appetite inducing medication for chemotherapy patients.  The ability 
of a sick patient to receive medication should not be subject to the whims of the 
zoning commission.  Patients should not be restricted in their travels to those 
places that allow for their medication.222
B. Impact on Other Businesses
Recently, the Los Angeles City Council banned new fast food restaurants 
from opening in South Los Angeles—a move that angered many residents.223 The 
ban came following the expiration of a moratorium enacted in 2008.224  The ability 
of the city council to ban new fast food restaurants from opening is rooted firmly 
in the same power that allows the city council to ban medical marijuana 
dispensaries.225 The city council has acted well within its authority in doing so; 
they have argued that the ban is directly related to the health and welfare of the 
city.226 Given the deference that the courts pay to the local legislatures, this claim 
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is unlikely to be disputed.227
This is the type of action that business owners must be wary of, and it is 
what marijuana dispensaries have in common with owners of fast-food restaurants, 
bankers, and retailers: all are subject to the zoning commissions’ decisions to 
allow, or not to allow, a business.  In Wal-Mart, a city ordinance banning “big-
box” retailers was upheld as a valid use of a local government’s police power.228  
The court determined that the increase in pollution, coupled with the fear of “urban 
decay,” was sufficient reason for the city council to pass the ordinance.229 The 
court also found that the unintended consequence of limiting economic 
competition was of no concern.230
It seems then, virtually impossible for a business to overcome a zoning 
ordinance that places restrictions upon it in excess of state law.  The complaining 
business must show one of two things: either state law preempts the ordinance, or 
the ordinance is unreasonable or arbitrary.231 The latter, as discussed, is very 
difficult to prove—so preemption is often the only argument to make.232
VII. CONCLUSION
The Home Rule has many valuable qualities—the most important of which 
may be the ability of communities to handle municipal affairs without interference 
from Sacramento.  Local governments are more amenable to the needs of their 
constituents, and are capable of tailoring rules and regulations to fit the needs of
the community better than the state legislature, which must legislate for a larger, 
more diverse group. 
Nevertheless, when state law expressly authorizes the existence of a 
business, product, or group, it seems extremely illogical that local municipalities 
should be allowed to reject the law and ban what the state has expressly 
authorized.  This argument is founded in the understanding that local governments 
are not autonomous islands.  As the court stated in Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 
“[t]he denial of power to a local body when the state has preempted the field is not 
based solely upon the superior authority of the state.  It is a rule of necessity, based 
upon the need to prevent dual regulations which could result in uncertainty or 
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confusion.”233 Further, local municipalities are an extension of the state 
government and should function as such. 
Zoning authority is one of many police powers granted to local 
municipalities through the Home Rule.  This power serves an important function in 
the planning and execution of a city, and when used properly, zoning ordinances 
truly do promote public health, safety, and the general welfare.  But, as Article XI, 
section 7 of the California State Constitution explains, municipal ordinances and 
regulations may not conflict with the general laws.234 It is from this rule that the 
doctrine of state preemption is drawn. 
Understanding the principles of preemption and the rules governing zoning 
authority, business owners can be armed with the information necessary to try and
protect themselves from ordinances that may limit a businesses’ growth or its very 
existence.  Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the current debate over medical 
marijuana dispensaries.  As Qualified Patients Association makes its way through 
the appellate process, the unjustifiable claims posed by the City of Anaheim should 
be disregarded, and the ordinance criminalizing what the state has expressly 
sanctioned should be struck down as preempted.  As local governments attempt to 
grapple with the sudden influx of cooperative corporations and collectives, the 
courts must continue to uphold the principles of preemption, and be wary of 
unreasonable and arbitrary zoning regulations.  
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